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This article introduces the concept of virtuality into the question of the ontological
status of ability-affordance relations in ecological psychology. By differentiating
concrete affordances and animal activities from the somatic-environmental net-
works they actualize, I argue that ecological-psychological thought is brought
into a better position from which to think the ability-affordance relation as a
ground for the developmental entanglements of organisms and their subjective
environments (i.e., the affordances that constitute their niches). I begin by sketching
the aporia to be filled in ecological psychology by an introduction of the virtual.
Then, I turn toward a brief elucidation of the concept of virtuality. In the terms
developed here, abilities and affordances together comprise a virtual meshwork
or field of dynamically linked rates of change, capacities, and tendencies that are
actualized or instantiated in terms of individual instances of organismic behavior,
environmental configuration, and coevolution. Armed with these conceptual tools,
I endeavor, in the article’s final section, to provide in terms of virtuality a properly
genetic analysis of the dynamic reciprocity between organismic abilities and the
recursive configuration of their subjective worlds (or fields of affordances) without
recourse to teleological functions, hylomorphic animal perception, or unknowable
environments.
The organism unfolds into its ecology, but its ecology enfolds back into the
organism; the organism is outside itself shaping its world, and its world is inside
the organism shaping its body.
—Adam Robbert, “Earth Aesthetics” (2013)
Tano S. Posteraro is now at Penn State University.
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University, 228 Sparks Building, University Park, PA 16802. E-mail: tano.sage@gmail.com
353
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
an
o P
os
ter
aro
] a
t 1
2:4
8 3
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
354 POSTERARO
To begin, a brief sketch of the concepts at hand. The way an organism’s
environment gives itself over to that organism is an affordance. “The affordances
of the environment are,” in James J. Gibson’s (1979/1986) own terms, “what it
offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (p. 127).
This computer affords me the ability to render a digitized and coherent stream of
thoughts. The floor affords me a surface on which to walk, the door a means by
which to isolate myself. Ability and affordance are, however, inextricably linked.
They are codefining, which “implies the complementarity of the animal and the
environment” (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 127). Word processing is a computational
affordance only for organisms capable of operating a keyboard. An airplane can
only offer itself as a means for transportation to organisms capable of purchasing
tickets and reserving seats. These latter capacities determine the airplane’s set
of affordances. An airplane affords humans a means for transportation but only
because they are, in the first place, capable of operating airplanes. It might afford
birds the potential for high-altitude collisions. Its affordances vary relative to the
capacities of whichever organisms relate with it. Ability and affordance are like
sound and auditory system. One hears only the sounds one’s ears are capable
of registering. Affordances are tied to abilities, in other words, the way sounds
are tied to their perception.
Affordances are defined by a relation between the features of a given envi-
ronment and the capacities of a present animal. Climbability is, in the famous
example, only an affordance of staircases for animals able to climb them (Cesari,
Formenti, & Olivato, 2003, pp. 111–124). Abilities, too, are defined by this
sort of relation: in the absence of an affordance of climbability, no animal
can climb. So the structure of organismic subjectivity, the relation between
organism and environment, emerges out of a set of ability-affordance relations,
each term of which is itself also a relation between organism and environment.
Further, in order to foreground the dynamism of these relations, in order to
think them developmentally, it is necessary to posit both their causal interaction
over time and their causal dependency on, or entanglement with, one another
(Chemero, 2009, p. 151). This dynamism comes in two temporal iterations:
developmental and behavioral. “Over developmental time,” in Chemero’s (2009)
words, “an animal’s sensorimotor abilities select its niche—the animal will
become selectively sensitive to information relevant to the things it is able to
do” (pp. 150–151). And on a behavioral timescale, “the animal’s sensorimotor
abilities manifest themselves in embodied action that causes changes in the
layout of available affordances” (p. 151). Most significant is, however, the
processually reciprocal nature of this relationship: the way changes in a layout
of affordances imply correlative changes in the way capacities are actualized.
But this is nowhere near as straightforward as its proponents suggest, for, as
Protevi (2013) indicates, “only the act of climbing a tree, not the unactualized
ability to climb, can knock some bark off the tree or strain a muscle” (p. 151).
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ON THE UTILITY OF VIRTUALITY 355
The task, then, is first to understand both abilities and affordances as relations
without rendering incoherent the claim that they causally interact over time and,
second to trace the implications of this dynamic reciprocity for the genesis of
organismic perceptual experience.
As my invocation of actualization suggests, the problem of relational causality
is to be resolved by way of the metaphysical resources developed earlier. First,
abilities ought to be conceived virtually. This resolves several puzzles in the
cognitive-science literature: it relieves the tension Anthony Chemero (2009)
sees between conceiving abilities, on the one hand, as “effectivities” (or po-
tentialities) and, on the other, as possibilities prefigured prior to actualization
without recourse to Chemero’s own concept of function (p. 145). Abilities are
inappropriately understood as possibilities precisely because they emerge out
of a relation between animal and environment and are manifested only under
specific conditions. In the absence of water, no animal can swim. Even in an
encounter with water, being able to do so is a skill, one developed in certain
circumstances and beholden to a set of conditions—even if those conditions
include embryonic development. Bergson’s (1975, p. 118) criticism is relevant
here: to claim of a professional swimmer that her skill was possible before actual
is to project the actuality of her ability backward, deprive it of reality, efface
the process of its actualization, and conclude that it existed first as possibility.
Abilities are not possibilities. Their conception as effectivities emerges orig-
inally out of Robert Shaw’s (2001) “Processes, Acts, and Experiences: Three
Stances on the Problem of Intentionality.” Abilities, for Shaw (2001), exist as
biological (or, in some cases, technologically mediated) functions whose aim is
to realize what he calls “the affordance goal” (p. 284). Shaw is, on this point,
quite clear: “Effectivities,” he writes, “always involve goal-directed biological
functions” (p. 284). Because the goal in question is constrained by present
affordances—that is, if an animal wishes to achieve higher ground, it must tarry
with whatever pathways or climbable surfaces are available—effectivities come
not only as the means to the realization of a goal but also more significantly
as the necessary complement to present affordances. So, in other words, in
order to realize a goal, a given animal puts one of its functions into play
with a relevant affordance. Understood as effectivities, abilities are functions
(i.e., in the sense that fingers function to grasp and hold), tied to affordances,
aimed toward intentions or goals (i.e., in the sense that the function grasp can
be aimed toward the goal grasp that branch). And, as such, they “transform
possible experiences into potential ones and potential experiences into actual
ones” (Shaw, 2001, p. 312). Put differently, before the advent of typewriters, it
was possible for human fingers to type. Alongside their invention emerged the
potential to type. Typing is a goal; that human fingers are functionally capable
of complementing the requisite affordance allowed them by typewriters makes
the act of typing potentially realizable. And, as fingers are marshaled in the
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right way on the keys of a present typewriter, that potential is transformed
into the actual act of typing. Given the right conditions (the availability of
a present typewriter, a set of working fingers, and the intention to type), the
effectivity becomes an actual activity. This is, to reiterate, the tripartite structure
of effectivities: (a) functions, tied to (b) affordances, aimed toward (c) goals. And
this is the tripartite structure of their manifestation in activity: the presence of
function indicates (a) possibility, the presence of a relevant affordance indicates
(b) potentiality, and the relation between the two toward some goal brings
potentiality into (c) actuality. This is Shaw. One need not, however, look much
further for a weakness in this account than the fact that abilities are nowhere
near so neatly predisposed (Turvey, 1992). Abilities, conceived as effectivities,
Chemero (2009) argues, “when coupled with the right enabling conditions : : :
are guaranteed to become manifest” (p. 145). This is their unlikely neatness.
Chemero is, I think, right to dismiss this conception on the basis that abilities
are not so straightforwardly actualized, even under the necessary conditions.
“Having the ability to walk does not mean,” in his words, “that one will not fall
down even in the ideal conditions for walking” (p. 145).
Chemero (2009) turns, however, illegitimately from a condemnation of effec-
tivity toward an appeal to teleology. Claiming for abilities a status as “functions,”
he yokes them to a principle of normativity: “Individuals with abilities are,” he
writes, “supposed [emphasis added] to behave in particular ways, and they may
fail to do so” (p. 145). If functions are not inevitably predisposed, they are,
however, monotonously or singularly so—and for that reason they also fail to
do justice to the indeterminately pluralistic nature of unexercised abilities.
Let us bracket for now the ontological status of unexercised abilities and
their relation to affordances. In order best to account for this status, I introduce
a philosophical distinction (taken from French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, 1994)
not between actual and potential but between actual and virtual. Let me explain
what I mean before reapproaching the issues delineated earlier.
It is easiest to begin by setting the virtual against what it is not. The virtual
is real but not actual. It precedes the actual, at least in concept, but does not
resemble or prefigure it. The virtual is not the possible. Neither is it appropriate
to speak straightforwardly of the virtual as potential. The virtual is real without
being actual the way a wooden desk’s capacities to burn, splinter, expand, or
crack are real without being actual. Before it is set aflame, the desk’s capacity to
burn exists but in unexercised form. Borrowing a terminological distinction from
Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (1990), the desk’s capacities are better described not
as existing but insisting (p. 81). They are not currently actual, but in different
conditions, they tend toward actualization; they insist. Capacities exist as if
on a spectrum of insistence: submerged in water, the desk’s capacity to catch
fire is especially far from becoming actual. Its capacities to expand, warp, and
eventually decay are, on the other hand, a lot nearer actualization. The virtual is
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ON THE UTILITY OF VIRTUALITY 357
not, therefore, a simple inverse of the actual: one reaches the level of virtuality
neither by depriving the actual of its reality nor by subtracting from it its concrete
existence.
Although initially it may seem intuitive to speak of virtuality as possibility,
doing so effaces both the degree to which capacities can insist into actual
existence and the fact that, prior to the advent of their actualizations, virtual
capacities do not resemble their concrete manifestations, unlike possibilities. To
sharpen this point, it is worth looking to Henri Bergson’s (1975) critique of the
possible. “The possible,” writes Bergson, “is only the real with the addition of
an act of the mind that throws its image back into the past once it has been
exacted” (p. 118). In order to arrive at the possible, we start, in other words, with
the real, with what already exists. We subtract from it its existence, project its
image backward, and proclaim that it existed first as a possibility subsequently
“realized” in the real. The process of this realization is subject, however, to the
rule of resemblance—which is to say that the real is supposed to resemble the
possible, to be actualized in its image. But, to borrow a line from Daniel Smith
(2009), “if the real is supposed to resemble the possible, is it not because we
have retrospectively or retroactively ‘projected’ a fictitious image of the real
back into the possible?” (p. 26). Exactly so. It is not the real that resembles the
possible but precisely the opposite: the possible is formed in the image of what
already exists. It is a purely negative concept, a negation of the actuality that it
is supposed to found. The virtual is, however, both real and nonactual. And it
is for this reason that the language of possibility is not adequate to the task of
accounting for capacities, tendencies, and relations that are not actual, that do
not resemble the actual, and that are furthermore differentiated from each other
as well as from their actualizations.
If it does not suffice to speak of the virtual in terms of possibility, then
it is equally misguided to attribute to it the status of potential. This is because
potentiality is defined either by its telos, the purpose or end to which it is always
oriented, or by an identity to its actual exercise (as is the case with possibility). I
take it that potentiality canonically refers to Aristotle’s (1995) conception of the
term. To say, then, that it is misguided to speak of the virtual as the potential is
to say that the virtual is decidedly non-Aristotelian. “We speak of perceiving in
two ways,” writes Aristotle, “for we say that something sees or hears both in the
case of something that has the potentiality for seeing or hearing, even though it is
asleep at the time, and in the case of something that is actually seeing or hearing
at the time” (p. 188). This is, then, the identitarian distinction—a distinction that
privileges identity at the expense of difference—between potential and actual: the
closed eye sees potentially, the open one, actually. Potentiality therefore refers,
in the first sense, to the horizon of identity a dormant capacity shares with its
actual manifestation. Although the difference between possible and actual is one
of existence, understood in this way, potential differs from actual only in terms of
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employment, application, or exercise. And yet, to take a line from Protevi (2013),
the virtual emphatically “does not resemble its actualization; there is nothing
identical in its being—it is fully differential” (p. 143). But, afforded a differential
definition, potentiality falls prey instead to the snare of teleology. Taking as a
model the way we speak of knowledge, Aristotle (1995) distinguishes two ways
by which potentiality is actualized. We say, in one sense, that “a man knows
because man is a kind of thing that knows and has knowledge,” and, in another,
that a man “who has grammatical knowledge knows” (pp. 189, 25–26). To know
the rules of grammar is to harbor an identitarian potential for knowledge; it is to
already have the knowledge that demonstration or explanation actualizes. “But in
the first case,” Aristotle continues, “we [pass from potential to actual knowledge]
by being altered through learning, and by frequent changes from the contrary
state” (p. 189). This is potentiality freed from the strictures of resemblance, for
“alteration” and “frequent change” denote a difference between the potential for
knowledge and its actual products. But this difference comes at the expense of an
invocation of teleology: we are, no doubt, altered in the process of learning, but
this is an end-directed change; it is guided, and its aim is present already before
learning occurs. If the subject has, in other words, the potential to know before
learning, this is because the acquisition of knowledge “is,” for Aristotle, “a
change into possession of a state and into the fulfillment of the subject’s nature”
(p. 189). This state is not prefigured before its actualization (as in identitarian
potentiality), but the potential for its possession is nevertheless oriented toward
it. This conception of potentiality is one of what I call monotonous disposition,
for it conceives potential as state specific. I use the term “monotonous” not to
denote a lack of interest or excitement but in its etymological sense: from the
Greek monotonos, “of a single tone or sound” (Harper, 2013). The potential for
a state—say, for having read Nietzsche’s (1995) Thus Spoke Zarathustra—is,
on this account, the specific capacity to attain that state, a capacity structured
by a singular disposition toward it. But this is emphatically not the case for the
virtual. The virtual is neither identitarian nor teleological. It is not structured in
terms of resemblances or monotonous dispositions.
The virtual is, now speaking positively, a differential field whose dispositions
vary relative to the specific conditions under which actualizations take place. As
such, the virtual counterpart of the state-specific potential to read Zarathustra is
a differential set of relations between capacities—say, between literacy of a suffi-
cient degree, access to the necessary resources, free time, literary interest, and so
on—that together constitute a “problematic field” the resolution or actualization
of which may be, in certain conditions, a person’s having read the book. But this
field neither prefigures that state nor does it tend monotonously toward it. To take
this example seriously, consider Little Miss Sunshine (Faris & Dayton, 2006).
Dwayne Hoover, one of the film’s central characters and a classically miserable
teenager defined by his existential malaise, is in one scene shown with a copy
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ON THE UTILITY OF VIRTUALITY 359
of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Dwayne seems sufficiently literate, he
spends a lot of time alone, and he longs for a life of value. This particular
conjunction of factors and circumstances makes likely a turn to Nietzsche. But
if he finds Zarathustra’s prose difficult, if Nietzsche’s aphorisms do not open up
before him, he might just as well turn instead to Camus. He might opt for the
catharsis of music or painting. He might resolve his restlessness in the pursuit
of a love interest. It is clear, in other words, that if Dwayne does decide to
take up the task of reading Nietzsche’s epic, it will not be because he harbored
from the beginning a potential to attain the state of having read it, whether
that potential is understood as an unactualized possibility, a dormant capacity,
or a monotonous disposition. Conversely, if Dwayne reads the book, it will be
because his literacy, his malaise, his aspiration, and his free time (among various
other factors and conditions) together constitute a “problematic field” resolved
by the actual act of reading Zarathustra. No one condition resembles, prefigures,
or tends monotonously toward the state of having read Nietzsche. Further, no
condition is on its own sufficient to account for the manifestation of that state.
Neither, however, does the conjunction of all of them result inevitably in the
state of having read the book. It is for this reason that, beyond a differential
and ateleological structure, the virtual is also defined as a problem—or, more
accurately, as a set or series of problems.
If it makes sense to speak of the problematic nature of virtuality, it is because
the advent of an actualization is best understood as the creativity of a resolution
or response. But problems do not for this reason preexist their solutions; they
are immanent to each other. This is the key to virtuality: problem and solu-
tion coemerge in a single movement. Put differently, processes of actualization
structure the problematic fields they resolve. Consider again Dwayne’s interest in
Nietzsche. The process of reading Zarathustra determines the elements whose
relations comprise the problem at hand: literacy, existential unrest, free time,
philosophical ability, and so on. When literacy or the process of learning to
read is itself the solution, then the problem it resolves is structured in terms of
cognitive condition, perceptual ability, access to educational resources, patience,
and so on. Problems are therefore nested, fitted one inside the other, together
constituting an expansive virtual terrain. One and the same solution can come
in response to two widely divergent problematic fields, whereas one and the
same problematic field can resolve itself in two widely divergent solutions. Just
as literacy is both an element in the problematic field resolved by the process
of reading Zarathustra and the resolution of a problem of its own, so too do
the elements of that field come as resolutions to still more distant problems.
And it is the process of learning to read that assembles a web of relations
linking cognitive capacity to an access to educational materials, a familiarity
with language, and so on. Dwayne cannot read Nietzsche without setting a
network of elements into relation with each other and thereby constructing a
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problematic field. The process of reading the book is therefore made possible
on the basis of a problematic field constructed in the very process of resolving
it.
Virtual problems are structured in terms not only of a relation of elements
but also by a specification of what I call singularities that are internal to each.
Singularities are thresholds. Every particular board of wood will, for example,
crack under a certain amount of weight. This “sensitive point” or threshold
is specific to the board in question. Different people can tolerate different
intensities of pain before flinching, different intensities of melancholy before
crying, different volumes of toxic material before falling ill. These singularity
thresholds emerge out of relations with other elements, as in the case of the
threshold between my sickness and health, a sensitive point crossed only in
contact with bodies outside of me. And they can change, “as in the case of
land that is over-farmed by one crop, becoming barren for that crop or taking
on capacities to support other crops” (Bryant, 2012). The elements of a given
problem therefore already contain their own singularities or points of sensitivity
and alteration, but it is the solution at hand that specifies their relevance. Each
of a problem’s elements must surpass a threshold specific to it in order to make
possible its resolution: Dwayne’s literacy, ambition, and philosophical capability
must reach singularities internal to each if he is to succeed in reading Nietzsche.
If he is, for example, lacking in ambition, the foreboding prose may push him in
the direction of an easier writer. If his literacy does not meet a certain threshold,
he may abandon his aspirations entirely, opting instead for a less demanding
interest.
To clarify what I mean by the creative gap between virtual and actual, take,
for example, the difference between education system and prison complex, two
incarnations of disciplinary virtuality. There is nothing prisonlike in this virtual
problem. Nor is there anything in it resembling a school. Instead, the problem
“contains only the relations and singularities into which a human population
to be controlled is put: corporeal distance, succession of exercises, precision
of movement, degree of obedience to command, and so on” (Protevi, 2013,
p. 10). The prison actualizes these elements in terms of a high degree of control,
intolerance for defiance, a systematically regimented schedule, the restriction of
bodies to cells or small rooms, and so on. A school actualizes the same elements
to a lower degree of intensity of control: bodies are still restricted to specific
spaces, movement is still regulated, obedience is still expected, but defiance
is met with a difference in grade or a note home, not solitary confinement or
corporal punishment (or so one hopes).
The intensive processes by which the problem comes to be individuated
in an actual structure refer to changes in the singularities at play in each
element. If teachers began handcuffing students to their desks during class time,
what was first a school would rapidly fade into something closer to a prison.
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This change represents an intensification in degree of control, a shift in the
singularity of one element of the problem (assuming, of course, a threshold
between vocal suggestion and physical restraint corresponding, at least in part,
to the difference between school and prison). Further, these virtual structures are
not static: their elements are dynamic, the relations between one and another
constantly shifting. A proliferation of less tolerant teachers represents a change
in a school’s restriction of the movement of its students just as it embodies a
shift in the intensity of an element of the disciplinary problem.
So much for philosophical elucidation. Armed with this conceptual distinc-
tion, let us now turn back toward the ontological status of unexercised abilities
and the dynamic nature of their relations with affordances. If abilities are to
be understood as virtual, as I suggest they are, it is because they come as
resolutions to tensions or problems that are latent in differential fields.1 Climbing
is the exercise of an ability to the extent that it resolves (or integrates) a
“fully differentiated neuro-somatic-environmental web” that neither resembles or
prefigures the activity of climbing nor tends inevitably or monotonously toward
it (Protevi, 2013, p. 143). The unexercised ability to climb exists as a distributed
field of relations between a given animal’s body (the somatic), its perceptual-
sensorimotor system (the neural), and various details of its environment. This is
what it means to say that, like affordances, abilities are relations, not because
the animal needs a staircase to climb in order to exercise the ability it has
to do so but because that very ability emerges out of (while at the same time
bringing together) a network of differential elements, a problematic field. And, to
reiterate, each element of a virtual problem fluctuates in tune with changes in the
others, implying a difference in actualization: given a staircase of a larger size,
a climbing animal’s legs must be longer, its muscles stronger, its will to climb
greater than might be necessary for a smaller staircase. The activity of climbing
is a resolution, a creative response to a problem structured in accordance with
the animal’s body and its environment. Given that problem, the exercise of an
ability in response is creative to the extent that it comes always as one option
among an array of many (Bryant, 2008, p. 154). Although certain solutions, the
manifestation of certain abilities, insist more so than others, the advent of any
one of them is never inevitable.
Problematic fields are nested, scalar: the staircase’s height, an element in the
problem resolved in the act of climbing it, is itself the resolution of another
problematic field entirely. The staircase is, however, not an ability but an af-
fordance. It is no surprise, then, that affordances too ought to be conceived as
1It is perhaps worth noting here that Shaw (2003) does invoke a language of virtuality but only
in reference to ideas, images, or memories (p. 101). In that sense, to say that the ability to climb is
virtual would be to say that it exists first as an idea or internal mental intention to be externalized
in the actual act of climbing. This is emphatically not the case for the present position.
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virtual. Doing so does, as I already indicated, make possible an analysis of the
causal relations they share with abilities; it also resolves the question of how
affordances can exist independent of the animals that perceive them. Animals do
not project affordances or features of environmental meaning onto an indifferent,
unknowable world. Even with my back turned, the climbability of my staircase
persists no less than does my capacity to climb it. Further, the properties that
together afford climbability existed before the dawn of human consciousness and
may, hypothetically, even outlive it—which is all just to say that affordances are
real. But, like capacities, they are only actual under certain conditions. No
staircase can afford climbability if all the animals capable of climbing it ceased
to exist, but that affordance does not surge into existence alongside the lives
of the relevant animals; rather, those animals actualize the affordance. Prior to
its actualization, the affordance exists (or insists) virtually. This is a claim the
implications of which are far-reaching and seldom appreciated. Chemero (2009)
holds that it makes necessary a nuanced ontological realism, one that ties the
subject to its world and situates experience somewhere between the two. This
ontology is, as I aim to demonstrate, best understood in terms of virtuality.
Affordances do exist prior to, and in the absence of, the presence of animals
capable of perceiving them. Affordances exist not as prefigured identities but as
meshworks of differential relations. These meshworks are resolved (or individu-
ated) into concrete affordances by the local perception of appropriately capable
animals. Affordant actualization repeats the actualization of capabilities because
the mechanism is, in each case, identical. The unactualized environmental affor-
dance climbability exists first as the same distributed field of relations resolved
in the act of climbing. To afford climbability, a staircase must be climbable. To
be climbable, there must exist animals capable of perceiving in it that affordance.
This is not, of course, to suggest that affordances come into existence, as if out
of nothing, only as they are interacted with. No, they are emphatically animal
independent, but in what that animal independence consists, or what it means
to ascribe an animal-independent reality to the affordance, is that prior to the
resolution of its virtual field the staircase is structured in such a way that, were
the right animal present, it would afford that animal climbability. It insists before
it exists in precisely the sense that the tendency a piece of wood has to burn
insists into existence under the right conditions. This is, again, what it means
for Gibson (1979/1986) to say that the essential relationality of affordances
“implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (p. 127). In
the same way, animals are capable of climbing to the extent that their bodies
are structured in such a way that, were the right affordance present, they would
be able to climb. Implicit in the structure of each is a relation between organism
(body) and environment (layout).
Experience (or sensorimotor action) happens between the two, simultaneously
actualizing an affordance as it expresses an ability, effectively tying together
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subject and world, organism and environment. Or, in Alva Noë’s (2004) phe-
nomenological description,
Experience isn’t something that happens in us [that is, in the subject]. It is
something we do; it is a temporally extended process of skillful probing. The world
makes itself available to our reach. The experience comprises mind and world.
Experience has content only thanks to the established dynamics of interaction
between perceiver and world. (p. 216)
Interestingly enough, Noë invokes a language of “virtuality” to account for what
perceptual content “manifests” as the subject explores its world by means of its
body. He does so, however, without the benefit of the ontology of the virtual that
I have described throughout the article and so falls frequently back into the trap
of conceiving the virtual as the possible or potential, forcing it into a structure
that inappropriately mirrors the actual. To modify Noë , then, the “dynamics of
interaction” need to be conceived intensively, relative to the singularities in each
element of a neuro-somatic-environmental field. Different organisms actualize
different affordances out of the same physical layouts. Certain spiders can, for
example, walk along the surface of a pond inside of which fish breathe, bacteria
replicates, and frogs drown. Organismic ability therefore operates as an intensive
individuation that actualizes an environmental affordance relative to the organism
(and ability) in question. And the apparatus of each individuation therefore varies
along with a given ability-affordance couple. In interacting with its environment,
the organism does not merely recognize a set of affordances but also individuates
and actualizes them. The mechanism of this individuation is emphatically not,
however, simply hylomorphic: perception does not impose itself on a formless
and inert matter. There is form (which is to say, affordance) already there,
insistent on the virtual level, prior to the advent of organismic activity (Noë,
2004, p. 105). It is in precisely this virtuality that the reality of affordances
consists: they do not exist (actually) so much as they insist (virtually); it is the
organism that guides them into actuality.
Changes in any one element of the able-affordant field imply corresponding
changes in the others, both in the virtual field and in its actual counterparts. These
changes and interactions take place first, it is true, on the level of the actual.
The animal’s ability to climb only impacts the layout of its environment when
exercised. “It is,” in Protevi’s (2013) words, “only these individuated actions that
can change the web of relations structuring the intensive processes that integrate
differential fields and produce action” (p. 152). There are two claims at work
here: first, that the exercise of an ability is the actualization of a virtual field of
relations, and second, that this field is comprised of elements impacted by actual
activity. The actual not only individuates the virtual but in so doing also lets
other potentialities insist to different degrees. Now, given that able individuations
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refer back to virtual affordances—and that the manifestation of affordances
necessitates the presence of abilities—changes in the actual, whether somatic
or environmental, correspond to reorientations in the layout of the virtual fields
they resolve. Changes to these fields manifest as changes both to organismic
capacity and to the environmental affordances that complement them. Thus,
when actual organismic activity means an impact in the physical layout of an
environment (as when a species alters its niche over evolutionary time), those
changes reorganize the virtual field individuated in that activity. A different
virtual field means a corresponding change in actual activity. Thus, the causal
relation runs from the actual, through the virtual, and back.
Causal relations span both developmental and behavioral timescales. De-
velopmentally, animals develop selective sensitivities, in tune with their sen-
sorimotor abilities, to relevant environmental features in a niche (Chemero,
2009, p. 150). A niche is, in Chemero’s (2009) words, “the set of situations
in which one or more of its abilities can be exercised” (p. 148). “This collection
of situations forms,” he continues, “the organism’s cognitive, behavioral, and
phenomenological niche” (p. 148).2 The animal’s niche will, in turn, “strongly
influence the development of the animal’s ability to perceive and act” (p. 150).
The animal’s activities alter its niche, and its niche influences the development
of its abilities, affording certain possibilities and constraining others. Without
delving too far into the minutiae of Niche Construction Theory, it is worth
noting how organismic activity impacts the organism itself and therefore the
future of that very activity. Post and Palkovacs (2009) take as an object of study
two populations of guppies, observing the way differential patterns of predation
lead to different populations in each, the implications of which include the fact
that different patterns of excretion produce fluctuations in algae growth and
potentially modify selection on guppy color through an increase in carotenoids
derived from the algae (pp. 1629–1640). Although a change in color alone
does not imply a corresponding change in ability, it requires no stretch of
the imagination to conceive of a case that does. Consider, for instance, the
way the activity of one organism alters the layout of affordances available to
another. Earthworms are known to alter the makeup of the soil in which they
live. A change in soil can mean a difference in selection pressure on local
plants. Different plants mean different vegetal ecologies, different niches, and
therefore a difference in the kind of sensorimotor abilities local organisms are
able to manifest. Thus, in the very manifestation of those abilities, the layout of
an organism’s environment is changed, both for itself (the earthworm) and for
others (species of plant).
On the developmental scale, this reciprocity is manifested in the operation of
natural selection upon the genetic composition of a population of organisms rel-
2For a more sophisticated exposition of the niche, see Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman (2003).
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ative to its environment. And, in the words of Richard Lewontin (2000), “as that
composition changes it forces a concomitant change in the environment itself.
Thus organisms and environments are both causes and effects in a coevolutionary
process” (p. 126). Put differently, as genetic composition changes, so too do the
abilities of which organisms are capable; and as those abilities change, so too do
the environmental affordances to which they correspond. Further, the way these
rates of change are linked, the way genetic composition and environmental layout
influence each other over time, is itself a temporal affair. In order to interact with
a feature of its environment, in order to perceive an affordance, the timescale of a
given organism must correlate with the timescale of that feature. Affordances are,
in other words, temporally relative to the organisms with which they interact.
A mountain, for example, can afford climbability only on sufficiently short
timescales. Over geological time, its contours become viscous. Of this relativity,
Manuel DeLanda (2002) writes,
the objective relativity of affordances with respect to temporal scales makes them
the ideal candidate to define the “lived present” of a particular individual, that is,
what this individual “perceives” within its own timescale as the relevant capacities
of the other individuals [or environmental features] interacting with it. (p. 91)
As a consequence, the elements and relations that constitute the virtual prob-
lems that underlie abilities and affordances are themselves dynamic. Organismic
ability therefore fluctuates in tune with rates of change in environments, species,
and their coevolutionary interaction.
If the developmental relation between ability and affordances concerns the
way organisms shape and are shaped by their environments in the activity of
living, on a behavioral scale, an animal’s activities “alter the world as the
animal experiences it, and these alterations to the phenomenological-cognitive-
behavioral niche, in turn, affect the animal’s behavior and the development of
its abilities to perceive and act : : : and on and on” (Chemero, 2009, p. 152).
What Chemero (2009) calls the phenomenological-cognitive-behavioral niche,
I call the organism’s practical field. Given the organism’s functional concerns
(say, swimming), its practical field is composed of those features (both able
and affordant) salient for the ongoing navigation of its environment (i.e., the
water). The organism has to coordinate its kinesthetic activity with changes
in its practical field. Deleuze (1994) speaks of a “conjugation of singularities”
that has to take place between one’s body and the virtual field of water if one
is to succeed in swimming. “Our real acts,” he writes, “are adjusted to our
perceptions of the real relations [in the practical field], thereby providing a
solution to the problem [of how to swim]” (p. 165). In order to successfully
negotiate a practical field, “the trick,” writes Protevi (2013), “is to maintain the
coordination of changes in the organism [the swimmer] with changes in the
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environment [the water]” (p. 152). It is to synchronize the rate at which what
one can do changes—how long can I hold my breath, how many strokes can I
perform before needing rest, against how strong a current can I move, and so
on—with changes in environmental affordances (strength of current, temperature
of water). Behavioral and developmental timescales are related reciprocally.
Indeed, developmental causality is itself constituted by the ability-affordance
relations that occur on the behavioral timescales of individual organisms. Further,
developmental changes constrain the way organisms behave practically. Abilities
and affordances therefore causally relate in two temporal iterations, although
each scale refers to the other.
In sum, somatic-environmental networks resolved in the manifestation of local
abilities and affordances are reorganized by the actual interaction of organismic
activity with environmental layout. The processes of this kind of reorganization
occur beneath the structure of organismic experience—which is to say that
physical features of the environment pressure selectively the physicality of an
organism’s body and that the activities of these bodies also organize and impact
the development of the physical features of their environments. At bottom,
abilities and affordances are sets of relations between, on the one hand, bodily
structure and the way capacities to act can be actualized in a given environment
and, on the other, the environment’s physical features and the way those features
are actualized relative to the activities of local organisms. The genetic condition
for the emergence and development of animal perception is the experiential
manifestation of a virtual field that links the animal with its world. And as these
relations change, so does the structure of experience, the sensorimotor-perceptual
abilities by which experience is defined. This organism is, as a consequence,
relentlessly dynamic and tied at its foundation to the organization of its own
world.
I have, in this article, brought to bear on the recursive, developmental mesh-
works of organismic ability and environmental affordance the concept of the vir-
tual. Doing so allowed me to put the organism into motion, tying it dynamically
to fluctuations in a neuro-somatic-environmental web individuated in concrete
behavior and actual environmental layout. I recast the question of dynamic (able-
affordant) relationality as the question of actual-virtual reciprocity, displacing
cognitive-scientific efforts to think the ontological status of affordances in the
absence of the present perception of local animals. I temporalized the dynamism
of these relations both behaviorally and developmentally, underscoring both the
practical coordination an organism must maintain with changes in its envi-
ronment and the way those changes affect, evolutionarily, the actualizations
of the organism’s own capacities and the way those actualizations contour
the niches in which the organism lives. I hope, in the last analysis, to have
demonstrated the utility offered to ecological psychology by a metaphysics of
virtuality.
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